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I
Throughout the 1970s and, now, on into the 1980s,
while the severe disarray of the domestic US economy
has been periodically masked by the recoveries that
follow each bout of recession, the disorder of the
international economy has been continually apparent.
Nonetheless, one set of central actors in international
economic affairs has maintained an image of power
and stability. The US-based multinational firms -
Citibank, ITT, GE, Exxon and the others - are seen
by their apologists and critics alike as bastions of
power, dynamic actors running the world economy.
To be sure, these US-based multinational firms are
extremely powerful, managing resources, commerce
and capital on a vast scale. Yet they are not in
control'. In spite of their power, they have not been
able to run the international economy effectively. The
old image of these corporations as possessing near
omnipotence is no longer appropriate (if in fact it ever
was). Ironically, the multinationals' earlier successes
prepared the way for their current problems -
problems that are at the root of the general instability
of the international economy in the 1980s.
Consider, for example, the case of ITT. An
aggressively managed multinational conglomerate,
deeply involved in the economic and political affairs of
other nations, ITT became in the late 1960s and early
l970s a prime symbol of US international power. As
economic stagnation and inflation disrupted the world
economy in the mid-1970s. however, ITT ran into
considerable difficulties. Foreign governments re-
stricted its operations; foreign based competitors
made inroads in its markets; and the company
encountered internal management deficiencies in
handling its extensive empire. ITT's international
business empire still stands, but at the same time its
problems have continued. These problems were
underscored in late 1981 when the loss to Japan's
Nippon Electric of a major switching gear contract in
Brazil led ITT to terminate its 53 year-old operation in
that largest of Latin American markets.
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The rise and then instability of ITT reflects experience
common to many US-based multinationals. lt is now
clear that just when US multinationals appeared to be
sitting on top of the world, their expansion rate was
beginning to ebb. During the 1950s and 1960s the
value of assets held abroad by US corporations grew at
a rate of seven to eight per cent a year (corrected for
inflation) - a rate of growth much higher than that of
the domestic economy. In the late 1960s and through
the 1970s, however, US multinationals' assets abroad
were growing at only about four per cent a year -
hardly more rapidly than the domestic economy.
Paradoxically, while difficulties abroad have slowed
the foreign growth of US companies, even greater
difficulties with maintaining earnings in the domestic
economy have increased the relative importance of
foreign-source profits. In the 1960s, profits coming
from foreign investment accounted for, on average,
about 14 per cent of post-tax US corporate profits; in
the 1970s, that figure had jumped to 21 per cent. Ford
Motor Company provides an extreme example that
dramatises US firms' growing reliance on their foreign
profits. In the late 1960s and early l970s, Ford
typically obtained some 20 per cent of its profits from
foreign operations. During the 1974 to 1978 period,
with the mid-decade slump, on average 50 per cent of
Ford's profits came from abroad. Then, from 1979 to
1983, Ford continually ran losses in the US that were
offset by foreign-source profits (though overall the
company still ran losses in 1980, 1981 and 1982). In
general, we have the ambiguous situation where, on
the one hand, stagnation and instability have led US
concerns to hold back the expansion of their foreign
operations, but, on the other hand, they have become
more dependent on those foreign operations.
It is time to start recognising the real position of US
business in the international economy. While US-
based multinational firms remain extremely powerful,
they also share the instability of the international
economy; indeed, their operations are a central part of
that instability. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to
characterise the international operations of US
business as constituting an unstable empire.
My primary purpose in this essay is to establish the
validity of this characterisation by examining three of
its aspects: the focus of US business operations abroad
on the penetration and control of markets; the
extremely large and rapid growth of US-based
international banking: and the increasing strains on
the organisational structures of the multinational
firms. These issues will be taken up in the following
three sections. Moreover, in analysing these issues, J
want to develop the hypothesis that the current
instability of the US business empire has arisen as a
consequence of the great success achieved earlier by
US corporations abroad; current weakness and earlier
strength are two parts of the same process. In the final
section 1 will consider some of the implications of my
argument and suggest how they offer a basis for a
critique of both conservative programmes to 'revitalise'
the economy and liberal strategies directed toward
'reindustrialisation'.
'I
Some insight into the nature of US business operations
abroad can be gained from a Business Week story of 17
May 1982, regarding the activities of US computer
firms in Mexico:
US computer makers are rushing to set up factories
in Mexico before the government slams the door on
the country's fast-growing market. Responding to
Mexico City's recent decision to tighten quotas on
computer imports as well as pressure computer
makers to produce locally, some 45 companies
have applied to make computers and peripheral
equipment in Mexico. In late March, Hewlett-
Packard Co became the first foreign company to
announce that the Mexican Industry Secretariat..
has given it the go-ahead . . . Hewlett-Packard was
allowed 100 per cent ownership of its Guadalajara
plant only when it promised to use a high
proportion of Mexican-made components
'Developing local suppliers will be a tough job',
says Richard S. Love. the company's director of
international marketing. As for sophisticated
parts, such as integrated circuits, 'nobody in
Mexico is making the right ones now', he says.
Thus Hewlett-Packard will concentrate at first on
buying relatively simple components, including
plastics, transformers, and sheet metal for cases.
This particular story is interesting because the
international operations of the computer industry are
often portrayed in a very different light. We usually
hear about the dependence of the computer industry
on cheap foreign labour for the production of
microchips and other components. The activities
described in the Business Week story are, however,
more typical of the international operations of US
business. The issue is markets. As they did in Europe
in the 1950s and 1960s. US companies accept the
pressures and limits placed on them by the Mexican
Government if they have a free hand to invest as a
means of obtaining access to and control of the
market. The cheap labour of Mexico is of secondary
interest to the companies. Indeed, as the story
suggests, the low technological level of the Mexican
economy restricts the firms because they cannot
always obtain the inputs they need.
To obtain confirmation that markets and not cheap
labour - and, in fact, not even raw materials - are
the main part of the game for US-based multinationals,
we need only look at the location of their expansion.
First and foremost during the last 30 years, the
companies have expanded in Europe. In 1950 only 15
per cent of the assets held abroad by US-based firms
were in Europe; by 1980, 45 per cent of their assets
were in Europe. In part this growth was accounted for
by the tremendous expansion of European manu-
facturing in response to the rapidly developing
market. In addition, the European market attracted
investment by the US oil companies, as they shifted the
principal source of their profits 'downstream' from the
control of well-head operations to the control of
market s.
Also, contrary to a widely held misconception, the
expansion of multinationals in the poor countries has
not taken place most where Ibour is cheapest. Indeed,
the expansion has been greatest where markets have
been largest and most rapidly growing. Within Latin
America. for example, US investment in manu-
facturing has become increasingly concentrated in
Brazil and Mexico, the nations with large, rapidly
growing markets, not the nations with the cheapest
labour.
The sales pattern of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries
of US firms also indicates that the firms are drawn to
invest in other nations in order to get at markets. Were
the firms drawn abroad by cheap labour, we would
expect that a sizable portion of their sales would be
exports back to the US market. Instead, US
manufacturing subsidiaries abroad are, by and large,
selling in the markets where they are located. Mexico is
a striking example. Given Mexico's proximity to the
US and the tax breaks given to 'border industries', we
might expect the sales of US firms in Mexico back to
the US market to be particularly large. On the
contrary, the data indicate that such sales by
manufacturing subsidiaries are in the neighbourhood
of five per cent of total sales. Not all cases fit this
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pattern; in particular, US subsidiaries producing
electronic equipment in the Far East export a large
and growing share of their output to the US market.
But these are the exceptions. The Mexican case is far
closer to the norm.
This picture of the activities of US-based multi-
nationals is at odds with an image widely held by
critics of the companies' operations. The exploitation
of cheap labour receives considerably more publicity
that does market-directed activity. Recently, special
attention has been focused on the tendency of some
multinational firms to organise their production
strategies on an international basis, to establish
multiple sources for component parts, and to shift
labour-intensive segments of manufacturing processes
to the Third World. The term 'new international
division of labour' is often used in this connection.
Available data, however, do n&t support the
contention that the role of US-based multinationals in
establishing a 'new international division of labour'
constitutes a central defining feature of their activity.
When US-based manufacturing firms operating in the
Third World are generally selling some 90 per cent of
their output in local markets, it is difficult to maintain
that these firms have established themselves in the
poor countries primarily (or even largely) as part of
some strategy - explicit or implicit - of
'rationalising' international production.
None of this is to deny that US workers in many parts
of the country have lost their jobs as their employers
have closed US operations and begun production
abroad with cheaper labour. Indeed, entire com-
munities have been devastated by this process.
Moreover, because it only takes a few such moves to
make the 'runaway shop' threat an effective bludgeon
at the bargaining table, the magnitude of the problem
is understated by the number of plant closures per se.
Nonetheless, such movements are simply not the
central factor in the overall operations of the
multinationals.
The importance of stressing the market focus of US
multinationals can be seen by recognising that this fact
is also at odds with a view often expressed by
apologists for the companies. Not infrequently, these
firms are portrayed as great leaders, international
engines of development, transforming and rationalising
the world economy, and thus supplying more goods
and more jobs for all affected. The reality rather seems
to be that they are followers, that they go where
markets are expanding. Instead of being aggressive
actors, using their technology and capital to transform
economies, they appear to be more conservative
operators, following markets as they grow, not
creating new avenues of prosperity.
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When the international economy was expanding
rapidly, the US-based multinationals expanded
rapidly along with it. They developed a mode of
operation then, however, that did not prepare them to
deal with the changes that began to appear in the late
1960s and became full blown in the 1970s. As market
followers, they were not in a position to protect
themselves from the general economic slowdown that
took place. Things could have been different. Had the
companies, for example, been oriented toward the US
market and gone abroad for raw materials and cheap
labour, their growth in the early era would not have
been so rapid; but then their slowdown more recently
would not have been so great, because the US
economy slowed much less in the 1970s than did the
economies of other advanced capitalist nations. Thus,
the success of the early period and the relative failure
of recent years are part and parcel of the same process.
The companies got into trouble at least in part because
of the nature of their early success.
The clearest evidence that they 'got into trouble' is the
substantial slowdown in their rate of expansion (noted
above), but one could also cite how US multinational
firms have fared relative to their rivals from,
particularly, Japan and West Germany. Foreign
investment by those rivals has been growing much
more rapidly than that by US firms, and in virtually all
industrial categories the domination of the market by
US firms has been substantially reduced. Rising
competition and the general slowdown of the
international economy have forced many firms to
undertake strategic readjustments. In particular, in
the 1970s there was a rise in the frequency with which
US-based multinationals accepted the imposition of
joint ownership arrangements. The experience in
Brazil stands out, but changes of the same sort also
seem to have been pressed on the multinationals in
several other Third World nations. Similarly, US firms
increasingly have been forced to live with nationali-
sations, the overshadowing case being the experience
in the oil industry. These sorts of developments do not
always mean great losses for the multinationals - so
far, at least, the oil companies have done quite well for
themselves in the face of nationalisations and joint
ventures. Yet these sorts of developments show how
the position of the multinationals has changed since
the early post-World War II era, and how that
position is now characterised by considerable
instability.
III
The ebb of activity by US-based multinational firms,
however, has not been uniform. One branch of US
business, in particular, has been highly successful at
increasing its claims on wealth created elsewhere.
Banking has become the most dynamic component of
US business involvement in the international
economy. In 1980, the interest received by US banks
from foreign loans had risen to some $27 bn from their
1970 level of less than $1 bn. That $1 bn in 1970 had
been only one-tenth as great as the profits US-based
multinationals were obtaining in that year from
abroad; the 1980 interest receipts were 75 per cent as
great as the multinationals' foreign-source profits.
US banks had not participated as much as one might
expect in the early post-World War II expansion of US
business abroad. Until the mid-1960s, their foreign
operations grew relatively slowly. The growth of the
US economy and the more rapid growth of US
multinationals, which the banks could service from
their domestic base, seem to have provided sufficient
outlets for the banks. In the late 1960s and early I 970s,
however, two major factors gave impetus to the
international expansion of US-based banking: the
tremendous increase in the availability of credit in the
international system and the relative decline of
profitable outlets for that credit in the advanced
capitalist countries.
The increase in the availability of credit was a direct
consequence of the way the US Government took
advantage of its internationally hegemonie position to
attempt to solve problems of the domestic economy.
In order to finance its efforts to fight the war in
Indochina while simultaneously buying off the urban
rebellions against poverty and racism at home, the
government expanded the supply of dollars. Since,
under the sway of US hegemony, the international
monetary system had been constructed after World
War II on the principle that the dollar was as good as
gold in international transactions, this extra supply of
dollars was in turn used to pay off growing US
obligations abroad. Thus an increasingly large supply
of dollars built up overseas in the late 1960s, and this
became the basis for the much discussed eurodollar
market. US and foreign banks that held these dollars
loaned them out without any of the constraints that go
with lending in the US market itself. Each dollar could
be lent, and then when it was deposited it could be
re-lent again and again, creating an ever growing
supply of credit, a huge volume of liquidity. In
addition, when OPEC succeeded in raising oil prices in
1973, the system's liquidity was greatly increased as
the oil exporting countries accumulated large
surpluses that they held in dollars.
This growing supply of credit, however, could not be
absorbed within the economies of the advanced
capitalist countries. For in these economies, as the
great post-World War II surge of economic expansion
began to give out and as excess capacity developed
internationally in major industries - especially steel
and automobiles - profit rates fell. When the
downturn of profit rates in the late l960s became the
crisis of the l970s, investment growth slowed
dramatically. In the US, the annual growth rate of
gross investment fell from 4.8 per cent in the l960s to
1.6 per cent in the 1970s; in Japan, the fall was from
14.6 per cent to 3.2 per cent; and in West Germany,
from 4.1 per cent to 1.6 per cent. With investment
opportunities apparently lacking in the centre, and
with actual investment growth slowing so greatly, the
banks became mechanisms by which funds were
'pushed' out into the rest of the world.
This 'push' of funds from the centre to the periphery
was, moreover, complemented by a 'pull'. The oil
price increase was the most obvious source of the
Third World's growing demand for credit, as oil-poor
countries turned to the banks to finance their huge oil
import bills. Oil events, however, were only a part of
the story. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
and other heavy debtors have built their economies on
a structure of dependence that has required them to
take in increasing quantities of foreign capital in order
to maintain growth. As long as their growth could be
maintained, even with debt rising, there was no severe
problem. Yet what happened at the end of the 1970s
was bound to happen sooner or later. Recession again
hit the world economy, and debtor countries could no
longer count on strong export demand to provide the
funds to pay off their debts.
These various forces - the 'pushes' and the 'pulls'
affecting international credit - brought the inter-
national financial system to the precarious position of
the early I980s, with nations on the brink of
bankruptcy and even people with the most remarkable
faith in the viability of the system talking of panic and
potential collapse. In November 1982, the Wall St.
Journal used its front page to print a fictitious tale, a
possible scenario, of financial collapse. The tale relates
how the failure of a small Hong Kong bank,
speculating in real estate, spreads until 'huge sums of
money begin to move electronically around the world
as banks, big investors, multinational companies, and
Arab governments shift their dollars to 'safe havens'
But, as the tale continues, big banks in the US and
Europe also start to run out of funds, and finally the
Journal writes: '... gloom spreads through the world
banking community as banks begin to fall like
ninepins'. Although the Journal made it clear that this
was 'an entirely fictitious scenario', it insisted that the
events 'could happen'. It is difficult to judge the
likelihood of an international banking crash of this
sort and of the subsequent disastrous effects it would
have upon production activity throughout the world.
Ifa crash began to develop, the governments of the US
and other wealthy capitalist nations along with the
International Monetary Fund would surely step in and
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attempt to avert it. Yet there is no guarantee that such
action would be sufficiently swift and effective.
In any case, the very fact that such a crash 'could
happen' makes a great deal of difference to the
functioning of the international economy. When the
threat of bankruptcy - and thus of crash - rises,
interest rates also rise as lenders insist on getting a
higher payment for the greater risk. Higher interest
rates are hardly conducive to the economic expansion
that might contribute to a solution to debtor
countries' difficulties. Moreover, the austerity pro-
grammes that are imposed have the same sort of
impact as do higher interest rates; they force continued
slump rather than growth. Austerity programmes also
raise considerably the likelihood of social and political
conflicts. Finally, when governments do take actions
to avoid a crash, they create other problems. Their
only 'solution' is to provide more liquidity. This can
have the dual impact of pumping up the debt balloon
even further - which may only postpone the day of
reckoning - and of pushing inflation ahead even
more rapidly.
Thus one need not postulate a high probability of
financial collapse in order to see the disruptive
implications of the growth of international banking.
Simply the spectre of a crash has a major impact.
Again, US business involvement in the international
economy is such that success is tied to failure. The
growth of international involvement by US banks in
the 1970s was a very successful way in which US
interests could claim a share of the world's wealth.
That success, however, has engendered a structure of
financial relations that makes the international
economy more prone to severe instability.
Iv
Faced with an unstable and hostile environment in
which to pursue profits, large US firms have
experienced internal problems that were unknown to
them in the golden era of the 1950s and early 1960s.
What is niore, the organisational structures they
established to operate in their time of strength appear
to be inappropriate to the new situation of instability.
ITT's experience is relevant in this context. Through
the early 1970s, ITT was able to grow rapidly by
conglomeration. lt needed a well co-ordinated system
of organisation to handle the financial manipulations
of such growth, and managers were 'taught not to
make things, but to make money'. The favourable
growth circumstances of the period limited operational
demands on ITT's management at the local level; it
was relatively easy to expand production and sell the
'things'. Yet, by the middle of the 1970s, the situation
had changed, and Fortune magazine, commenting on
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ITT's poor profits in 1974, noted, 'In many ways the
results of 1974 suggest the difficulty of managing and
controlling a sprawling multinational complex'. ITT
then entered on a progranime of selling off many of the
subsidiaries it had acquired in its period of rapid
conglomeration, giving evidence that it did not have
the managerial organisation to handle such diverse
holdings in hard times.
Other large firms also experienced managerial
difficulties as instability beset the international
economy in the late 1960s and early l970s. In general,
it appears that the very rapid international expansion
by some firms in the l950s and 1960s was an over-
expansion, stretching companies beyond the capa-
bilities of their organisational systems. Even the
experience of General Electric (GE), a company noted
both for its managerial acumen and successful
international operations, illustrates the problem. In
the late l960s, GE was forced to curtail its drive into
European markets. To explain GE's difficulties, the
business press cited poor management coordination in
Europe, lack of internationally experienced executives,
lack of technical skills, and clumsy labour relations.
The nature of GE's problems suggests that its
European expansion and acquisitions policy was
based on conditions that were ephemeral; the
company did not have the capacity to deal with the
more difficult - competitive and uncertain -
environment that emerged at the end of the 1960s.
It is widely recognised that the far-flung and complex
activities of multinational enterprises, even when they
are operating under the best of circumstances, demand
extensive and sophisticated managerial structures.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the era of US hegemony
and of rapid international expansion of the US-based
firms, the multinationals developed highly centralised,
tightly controlled managerial structures. Subordinating
the interests of the local units to the interests of the
total firm, these structures allowed the firms a high
degree of international flevibilitv which gave them
great power. Centralised control gave the firms the
ability to: reallocate financial resources among
subsidiaries; establish marketing strategies within a
company-wide plan; control research, development
and innovation; minimise tax obligations through
adjustments of internal pricing structures; rationalise
production facilities to minimise costs on an
international scale; and overcome political regulation
through the threat of relocation.
Yet, while centralisation allowed international flevi-
biliti', it limited local flevibilitv. Subsidiaries of
extensive US-based multinationals were not capable
of responding effectively to local circumstances,
whether those local circumstances involved changing
market characteristics, new government regulations,
or new forms of competition. Nonetheless, in the era
of US hegemony, the firms faced little competition
from Japan and Europe, and they had the
overwhelming political authority of the US Govern-
ment behind them; thus they did not experience
serious difficulties from their lack of local flexibility.
Hegemony and rapidly expanding markets meant that
the highly centralised structures worked well.
As these circumstances changed during the 1970s,
however, the US-based firms tended to remain caught
in the organisational mode of earlier years. There is
considerable inertia in the firms' practices, and they
seem to be slow to adjust, especially when compared to
their Japanese rivals. For example, centralised control
structures produced a strong aversion to joint
ownership arrangements by US-based firms. The
aversion has been maintained, but firms from other
advanced capitalist countries are generally more
flexible. The US firms' approach is seen in IBM's
practice of refusing to enter a country where it cannot
maintain 100 per cent ownership. The Japanese, at the
other extreme, sometimes appear to adopt a practice
of taking any arrangement necessary to establish in a
country and making the most of it. As a consequence
of this difference in approach, a Japanese firm can
have far-reaching connections in a Third World
country through minority ownership in several
companies, while a US firm with the same
commitment of capital will be the full owner of one
company. In reality, the former may have far more
extensive de facto control, and the latter's operations
may be hampered by its subsidiary's high profile as
foreign owned.
The difference between US and other multinationals
do not appear to be as great in their operations in the
advanced countries. Nonetheless, there are differences
that suggest that US firms continue to labour under
the assumption that the rest of the world must adjust
to them rather than they to the rest of the world. US
firms still tend to drive for full ownership in the
advanced countries; they do not easily accept worker
participation programmes, such as co-determination;
they have more labour conflicts than do other
multinationals; and their local managers are endowed
with less authority.
Many US-based firms, to be sure, have been doing
quite well in their international operations, as is
indicated by the substantial profits they are bringing
from abroad. High tech' firms of various sorts
probably provide the best examples. Still, it seems
reasonable to assume that the sort of organisational
problems illustrated above are, if not typical, at least
widespread among US multinationals. In general,
these companies have a common history in the
international economy, and this common history has
led them to develop similar sorts of strategies. The
world economic crisis, moreover, presents them with
common pressures. Where the consequent organi-
sational contradictions are not manilèst, they are
likely to be latent and threatening.
In the 1980s, the firms need considerably more local
flexibility, at least as much as they need to maintain
international flexibility. Their orgamsational struc-
tures, however, are not designed to provide this. It is
not at all clear how successfully and quickly the firms
can adjust and overcome organisational inertia. Even
if they were to adjust, this may not rectify the
situation. The dominance of the international
economy by US multinationals has been based in
significant part on the advantages of their highly
centralised structures, their tight control of an
international system. Thus, if they give up some of that
control in order to develop local flexibility, much of
their advantage as multinationals is gone. They then
become little different from large nationally operating
firms, and foreign ownership may even prove to be a
liability.
With US business and the US Government no longer
hegemonic in the international system, centralisation
is no longer so effective. At the very least, altered
circumstances mean the continued relative decline of
the US multinationals as they struggle to adjust and
match the operations of their Japanese and European
rivals that are not burdened by outmoded organi-
sational structures. But further, if the extreme
dominance of the multinationals has been based on
the power they derived from their centralised
structures, and if in today's world economy such
structures no longer work so well, then the extreme
dominance of the multinational firms is not likely to
be maintained. Multinational firms remain tremen-
dously powerful and important, but it is clear that
their position in the international economy is
changing significantly.
t'
In a general sense, the economic disorder in the
international system - and by extension the political
disarray associated with that disorder - has been
unavoidable. We did not get where we are because of
either bad luck or bad policy. We got into the current
mess as a result of the very process and particular
nature of the long post-World War II economic
expansion. The golden years of US hegemony, the
success of an early period, produced the disorder, the
failure of the current period. I have tried to argue this
with each aspect of US international business I have
discussed: the multinationals are in a weak position
currently because, through their focus on markets,
they were in a strong position earlier; the expansion of
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international banking was a successful response to the
onset of general slow growth and inflation, a response
that necessarily generated the current debt crisis; and
the internal, organisational difficulties that are faced
now by many multinationals are firmly tied to
organisational successes of earlier years. This sort of
analysis can be extended to cover the general
difficulties that the US Government and US business
are facing with regard to their international relations.
Such a line of reasoning leads one to recognise that the
current debacle was not created by some wrong-
headed policy choices in either Washington or
corporate board rooms and, conversely, that things
cannot be set right by the adoption of 'correct' policy.
The Reagan Administration attributed the inter-
national problems of US business to the policies of
past administrations. Accordingly, to 'revitalise' the
US economy the Administration attempted to re-
establish the extreme dominance of the US Govern-
ment in international military and political affairs.
Aside from the fact that this political goal is probably
unattainable (and to say nothing of the fact that it is
abhorrent), the policy would have a salutary impact
on economic affairs only if the operations of US-based
multinationals were basically sound, lacking only a
favourable political context in order to surge forward
once again. The analysis presented in this essay,
however, suggests, to the contrary, that US firms
themselves have created the conditions for their
difficulties and that these difficulties are built into the
basic structure of their operations.
Several people who offer alternatives to Reagan's faith
in the wonders of private enterprise recognise that
these serious problems have origins within the firms
themselves. Accordingly, to re-establish the pre-
eminence of US business these critics prescribe new
approaches for management and government policies.
These proposals are usually grouped under the rubric
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of 're-industrialisation' strategies, and they are often
associated with liberal political perspectives. Re-
industrialisation advocates might see the analysis
made in this article as consistent with their own
position. They recognise the insufficiently innovative
strategies of many large firms, decry reckless
behaviour by banks, and stress a need for firms to
adopt managerial structures that are more flexible at
the local level.
Yet the analysis here is fundamentally at odds with the
re-industrialisation approach, which focuses on
symptoms and gives scant attention to the deeper
causes of the instability in which US-based multi-
nationals have become enmeshed. In much of the re-
industrialisation literature, managers are exhorted 'to
be more flexible', 'to learn from the Japanese', and 'to
be more far-sighted', as though the roots of the
problem were insufficiently rigorous MBA (Master in
Business Administration) programmes, lack of will, or
just plain pigheadedness. In general, the call is for
managers to correct their mistakes and do things
'right'. The argument in this article, however, is not
that managers made 'mistakes'. They did not fail to
succeed; on the contrary, they have been failing
precisely because they did succeed.
My argument implies that policy reform, either at the
governmental level or within the corporations, either
're-vitalisation' or 're-industrialisation', is likely to be
ineffective in the current crisis. This is not to say that
the crisis will continue indefinitely. International
capitalism has experienced prior periods of crisis -
for example, during the 1930s and World War II -
and it is clear that the system can endure such
disruptions. But, in addition, past experience also
indicates that, however we come out of the current
situation, the changes will be structural both within
and between nations. Such changes are neither directly
controllable nor easily foreseen.
